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INTRODUCTION 
Today multinational corporations (MNC) are, in order to face diverse demands, 
organized in more complex ways than ever before. In the reorganizations their local 
country operations – subsidiaries – have been transformed.  
From the beginning of 1980s there is a distinguishable stream of research in MNC 
theory that focuses on subsidiary issues. This research has risen mainly from countries, 
which consider MNC subsidiaries important for their economies, such as Canada, UK, 
Spain, Denmark and Sweden, and deals with issues such as headquarters-subsidiary 
relationships, subsidiary strategies and subsidiary development.  
There are a couple of reasons, why such explicit focus on subsidiary issues is all but 
natural. Firstly, it is the position of former, independent ‘miniature replicas’ that can 
considerably deteriorate in the rationalization-integration into MNC’s global operations. 
Subsidiaries have developed capabilities and would like to be more than just parts of a 
system controlled from outside (Morrisson & Roth [1993
→
]).  
Secondly, it is a fact, that in spite of all the process of globalization, there still is a 
strong justification for subsidiaries as such. There are reasons on ‘demand side’ – as 
differing wishes give inspiration to local units – and on ‘supply side’.  
On ‘supply side’, because despite the operations being increasingly footloose, there still 
are ‘sticky’ capabilities, that are hard to transfer (Birkinshaw & Hood [1998b→]).  Also 
because despite the increasing mobility of people, most of them will still spend the main 
part of their career in home country; and despite of developing information technology, 
there are still advantages to geographical proximity.  
Current thesis is also focusing on MNC subsidiaries. It is in line with works of 
Birkinshaw [1995a
→
, 2000
→
], which claim that in the framework of local 
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responsiveness and global integration (Prahalad & Doz [1987
→
]), MNCs are perhaps 
currently relying too much on product divisions (global integration). So, for instance, in 
order to take different initiatives within MNCs, subsidiaries must become more 
“stocky” – not so lean and tightly integrated.  
Current thesis does not speak of the geographical dimension, though. It explicitly 
considers the uppermost position on that dimension – the subsidiary general manager 
(SGM) – and brings out contributions this post can make. This way it leaves out cases 
such as advocating for the whole dimension and reorganizing through uniting all 
marketing forces within a country (in order to gain customer servicing related 
synergies
→
 as discussed in Forsgren & Johansson [1992
→
]).  
The point of origin of the thesis can be said to be in the statement made by Birkinshaw 
[1995a
→]: ‘*there is a need for strong subsidiary general managers to provide coherent 
vision for subsidiary /…/ So that the subsidiary would not just be a group of value-
added activities that happen to be located in one country’. As opposed to statements 
made by product dimension proponents – Humes [1993→] claiming that country 
managers should be weakened at their position, stating emotionally ‘there is a need to 
lessen the degree of influence of country barons’. Or from anecdotal evidence, a case 
study by Hedlund & Ridderstrale [1995
→
] finding instances of bounded rationality in 
rationalization-integration processes of MNCs in the case that has strong subsidiary top 
management, but not in the case where product divisions dominate.  
The study sets out to explore this contradiction in literature, to find out how authority 
position helps subsidiary general manager to contribute in a MNC. The issue is viewed 
in light of recent conceptualizations of MNCs that leave space for further investigation.  
From one side literature has emphasized internal competition within MNCs, resulting 
in, for example, its definition through internal markets (Birkinshaw [2000
→
]). At the 
same time focus has been on achieving maximal leverage of MNCs’ capabilities 
through effective knowledge sharing and cooperation (Ghoshal & Bartlett [1997
→
]).  
As MNCs have to find a delicate balance between these countering requirements, the 
purpose of this study is to explore what is the role of subsidiary general manager in 
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balancing subsidiary between internal competition and centre of excellence type of 
knowledge sharing. 
This work is consists of an analysis of literature and empirical research the former 
provides a basis for. It seeks answers to the following research questions: 
 What are the relevant characteristics while considering MNCs generally, and for 
the SGM post in particular? 
 How have recent theoretical developments emphasized MNC’s multi-
centeredeness, thereby giving subsidiaries an increasing attention? 
 How can we classify subsidiaries for the purpose of selection and 
differentiation? 
 How does the process of internal competition differ from a focus on knowledge-
sharing, and what is the role of subsidiary general manager in both cases? 
The research problem investigated has so far not been described in necessary depth and 
thus calls for qualitative exploratory research. The empirical research conducted in this 
thesis is carried out in form of case studies by conducting interviews.  
The companies studied are two Estonian subsidiaries of big multinational corporations, 
both being worldwide leaders in their respective business areas. Both subsidiaries in 
turn meet the condition of being ‘substantial’ enough for it to be possible to apply 
concepts discussed in contemporary MNC literature.  
The thesis is organized in three chapters. The first two outlining theoretical basis and 
the third presenting results of empirical investigation. The first chapter takes the level of 
the multinational as a whole. It speaks of MNCs’ characteristics in 1.1. and 
development of theories in 1.2. Also throughout the discussion additional points 
concerning SGM’s post are brought up. In the end of the chapter, characteristics are 
linked to the SGM’s discussion.  
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Second chapter gives a classification of subsidiaries in 2.1. In 2.2 the process of internal 
competition is outlined. The knowledge sharing processes are discussed in 2.3. In the 
end a hypothesis is put forth for empirical investigation.
i
 
In 3.1 of the third chapter an overview is given of companies studied showing 
characteristics that are of further relevance for the study. Part 3.2 presents the results of 
case study interviews. In the end the work is concluded with a discussion. Further 
implications for research are also outlined.  
It is interesting to note that Estonian research into MNC subsidiary management was 
practically non-existent at the time, when the first articles used in this work were 
gathered. This although foreign investments have been very important for Estonia, and 
operations of MNCs subsidiaries have accounted for many successful cases in 
development of the economy. Hopefully this work has also helped by discussing some 
articles that are worth further investigation. 
This work would not have been possible to write without the help and co-operation 
from Estonian subsidiaries ES Sadolin and Saint-Gobain Sekurit Eesti. Author is deeply 
indebted to both the organizations and individuals for taking their time to participate in 
the study and co-operating in a splendid way. Author is also very grateful to his tutors 
Urmas Varblane and Zuhair Al-Obaidi from Helsinki School of Economics for their 
guidance and advice. Author would also like to thank Julian Birkinshaw from London 
Business School for his answers concerning specific topics of subsidiary management.  
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1. HETERARCHICAL MNCS 
 
1.1. Characteristics of MNCs resulting from changing 
environment  
During the 20
th
 century Multinational Corporations (MNC) grew enormously both in 
size and number and, in parallel with current expansion of capital sphere vis-à-vis social 
sphere(Ruigrok & van Tulder [1995
→
]), are taking on an increasing role in world 
affairs. In settings which are (acceleratingly) changing the MNCs have themselves 
retooled. As an example of their influence on theory Hedlund [1993
→
], pointing to one 
work by Casson, writes that ‘some lines of research take the view that MNC should be 
the general case for the theory of the firm to discuss, so that simpler types of company 
would be treated as special cases’. 
To start analyzing the MNCs, it is important to show some of their characteristics. It is 
the point of view of this work that MNCs should be considered as essentially three-
dimensional. An MNC can thus be characterized by its product (eg. products h1, h2, h3, 
i1, i2 and divisions H, I
ii
), geographical, and functional properties (eg. marketing, 
production and R&D).  
Humes [1993
→] brings examples from world’s biggest companies throughout the 20th 
century that have in the past shown themselves to be archetypal, built dominantly 
around any one of those dimensions. Perlmutter’s [*1969→] polycentric MNC is the one 
built around geographical lines and geocentric is a product (division) company. Many 
Japanese MNCs have been documented at using function based structures (Humes 
[1993
→
]).  
We are now going to discuss environmental changes
«
 that have taken place recently and 
had their influence on the way MNCs organize along the three dimensions. As 
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discussed for example in Buckley & Casson [1998
→
], UNCTC [1993
→
], Ghoshal & 
Bartlett [1995
→
], Birkinshaw [1996
→
], Porter [1986
→
] and Jeannet[2000
→
], by the 
middle of 1970s trade liberalization was well underway.  
One big consequence for MNCs was the process of rationalization – from tariff barrier 
separated geographical structure to product (division) structure. We will come back to 
this issue in section 2.1
iii
 and for now it is enough to say that MNCs tended to organize 
around product divisions.  
The middle 1970s were the end of the postwar Golden Era of growth, in which 
economies had been moving quickly and unidirectionally upwards. As economic 
climate changed it could thereafter best be characterized as less pacedly growing and 
increasingly* volatile.  
As for lower growth oil-crisis was one factor. In part it has also been attributed to 
economic policies that concentrated on control of inflation and not on expansion of 
demand, and to the fact that major industrial countries failed to co-ordinate their policies 
so as to ensure steady growth combined with internal and external equilibrium.  
In the following period trade liberalization process was to some extent retracted – 
through raising non-tariff barriers. And as Bretton Woods system collapsed flexible 
exchange rates were put into use. Up to that point the progressive (predictable) 
dismantling of trade barriers and highly estimable exchange rates between major trading 
nations had arguebly been enabling the high growth of the Golden Era.  
Flexible exchange rates were one emergent source of volatility. Another was that, as a 
consequence of liberalization processes, world economy had become increasingly 
interdependent and thus the shocks in it spread more widely. The interest rates for 
instruments in use within countries became more volatile. As for the fluctuation of 
economic growth itself, it can be said that the two biggest recessions since 1930s 
happened in the next decades. As the Far-Eastern economies rose another source of 
volatility was added – the interdependent world economic system was thereafter simply 
determined by more variables.  
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Some more things should be noted about the emergent situation. As a bigger number of 
economic powers were relevant in world’s economic system, there were now more 
regions to be drawn upon for their capabilities, that is through subsidiary corporations. 
Emerging Far-Eastern corporations meant increasing competition for Western 
companies.  
Moreover, competition intensified in growing globalization of demand, and also due to 
the low growth climate and expanding R&D costs. As for example foreign direct 
investments (FDI) into US had been insubstantial, it increased considerably indicating 
among other things a battle for US MNCs home turf. Lastly it should be noted, that if 
environment of MNCs subsequently contained more information, the developments in 
information technology field enabled its more efficient dispersal in compensation. 
Conceiving the resultant, much more complex situation it became clear that ‘MNCs 
could no longer exist the way they had been [during the Golden Age] – as top-down-
systems driven formations, where lower levels were for the purpose of gathering 
information, handing it upwards first and acting on the intention of the brain of the firm 
later’ (Ghoshal & Bartlett [1995→]). Also studies that investigated MNCs found them to 
be structurally very complex embodiments, that in our three-dimensionality discussion 
can be labeled to have a divergent, partially overlapping structural map.  
In order to cope with the volatile environment MNCs drive for flexibility. They are 
flexible by using (ever-changing) heterogenous control relations – that is there are 
different centers in MNCs that have different areas of control.  
As displayed in Figure 1 a, say Australian, subsidiary of an MNC may have developed 
into World Product Mandate (WPM – cf. Roth & Morrison [1992→]) assignee. This 
means that it has acquired control of the full value-added scope (eg. logistics, R&D, 
production and marketing) of a specific product or product line (a product from the 
chemicals division – c1) with responsibility of producing for world market and 
controlling all sales operations.  
On the other hand the sales people in Stockholm (thus the Swedish subsidiary) are so 
successful in creating home-electronics division’s (H) marketing campaigns, that they 
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are formally acknowledged as its marketing Centre of Excellence (CoE – cf. Moore & 
Birkinshaw [1998
→
], more closely discussed in 2.3
iv
) for the Western hemisphere*. 
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The third example would be a case of facilities of home and industrial electronics 
divisions (H, I) in the US. As there is a big volume of operations in that subsidiary, it is 
spotted that the cross use of plants between the products can be of a benefit. 
Additionally synergies are sought for in R&D as the technological fields are related and 
scientific personnel tend to work in national research clusters
vi
. (For example 
Birkinshaw [1995a
→
] mentions complementary activities in a subsidiary).
→
  
Thus if in WPM control was exercised on product dimension and CoE exhibited 
function based arrangement, then here the coordinating, transporting and 
communicating work is feasibly intensified within US and geographical dimension 
prevails.  
Important issues for this work are the emerging conflicts of interest, as already the main 
research issue – competing and sharing – is a conflict situation. But hereby we are going 
to begin with a basic case of disagreement between R&D and marketing. R&D 
department prefers little communication as marketing is said to be giving away all the 
secrets to competitors, whilst campaigning; and marketing blames the lack of 
communication for the creation of supposedly out of touch products, that do not succeed 
in the marketplace.(Hedlund & Ridderstrale [1995
→
]) 
Another case of conflict can be constructed in our three-dimensional space. Let the 
intracountry synergy creation this time consider marketing. Some works from 
interorganizational theories school consider development of relationships in business 
networks (eg. Forsgren & Pedersen [1998
→
], Forsgren & Johansson [1992
→
], Forsgren 
& Pahlberg [1992
→
]). They state that due to mutual adaption in practice business 
relationships often develop into something between the arms length market interaction 
and strict hierarchical ‘fiat’.  
As it was also mentioned in introduction,
→
 Forsgren & Johansson [1992
→
] write 
subsequently that in MNCs there is an effect in combining marketing operations with 
often shared customer bases as is in our case of home and industrial electronics division. 
Now lets say that there is a home electronics product, cassette player, that is 
WPMandated to Taiwan’s subsidiary. This means that in addition to producing it, 
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Taiwan should also control the marketing operations worldwide. And thereby we see a 
conflict between two simultaneous goals.  
As a possible way of resolving such a conflict, which by the way can be said to take 
place between two subsidiaries
vii
, both trying to enhance their sphere of influence
→
; 
Forsgren & Johansson [1992
→
] write that marketing units can be combined into profit 
centers with some control (such as over staffing decisions) being given outside. We can 
however conclude, that if Figure 1 showed a divergent structural map of an MNC, then 
the current example represents a structure with divergent and partially overlapping 
control relations.
1
 
 
1.2. Latest development of organizational aspects in MNC 
theories 
One important step in development of MNC theory have been the seminal works of 
Bartlett and Ghoshal, in which the concept of Transnational was developed. 
Transnational (cd.
2
 eg. Bartlett & Ghoshal [1992
→
]), balancing effectively the differing 
pressures MNCs face, is a company operating a divergent, partially overlapping map 
that we previously described.
viii
  
It is, however, interesting to look at the way the structure of Transnational is presented. 
Authors [1992
→
] say that companies have one general macrostructure, for example a 
product division structure. The macrostructure is complemented by relationship 
between line (of command) and staff of a MNC.
ix
 And the complex structural demands 
are solved with microstructural tools – elements of microstructure are besides different 
control relations we described, for example, task forces and committees. Authors also 
coined the term administrative heritage of corporation and, for example, in Ghoshal and 
                                                          
1
 At this point we can also say, why MNCs should be considered essentially three-dimensional. Because 
this way we can see different processes as having a common origin, only applied along varying lines. For 
instance, if CoE is basically a mean for leveraging information across geographical boundaries, then 
intracountry synergy creation does the leveraging across divisional boundaries. And the case that had 
coordinating problems between R&D and marketing, being an example of interdependencies and a need 
for integration, can also be said to need leverage across, this time, functional boundaries.  
2
 Cd. is used in this work as an abbreviation marking that Concept (is) Discussed in a certain work. It is 
applied to simplify distinguishing cases where the concept used in sentence is investigated in another 
work, in general, form and cases where current sentence quotes a specific idea put forth by another 
author. 
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Bartlett [1990
→
] say that this might have a great deal of influence on which actual 
macrostructure is used in a corporation.  
Thereby if once the “structural archetype” that was used in MNC might have been a 
very good descriptor, now the fact that, for example US, European and Japanese 
companies tend to use different macrostructures is no longer as decisive. These are the 
lower level structural solutions that are similar, and that matter. This is actually a step 
forth from the work of Humes [1993
→
], who still emphasizes archetypes and operates 
with them.  
Later works on MNCs have gone still further as they have arrived at a question whether 
it is at all feasible to differentiate the uppermost (or overriding) hierarchy in 
organizations. The works of Hedlund [1986
→
, 1990(with Rolander)
→
, 1993
→
] draw on 
manifests for change of perspectives in a wide range of sciences. The main idea being 
that the reality is actually organized non-hierarchically and that we are only accustomed 
to working with it through hierarchies. One good example from complex embodiments 
is highest level in evolution – the brain (or neural network) –, functioning of which we 
can not completely explain, but which surely is a non hierarchical system.  
Hedlund [1986
→
] speaks of MNCs as heterarchical and describes their different 
characteristics. In heterarchy works, organizations also have a partially overlapping and 
divergent structural map. But here the units are termed centers, each having a different 
degree of influence – which is, for example, one of the validations for the claim that no 
structural dimension should be considered superordinate to the rest. In accord with 
stripping the corporation of the macrostructural tool of transnational, Hedlund [1993
→
] 
brings examples of corporations that take pride for not having an organizational chart 
published at all.  
There are also other works with similar point of view. The works on business 
networks(eg. Forsgren & Pedersen [1998
→
]) often do not make qualitative 
differentiation between cases wherein an organizational unit is involved in transactions 
with sister units and cases wherein transactions take place with external parties. Thus 
we can again speak of multicentered view of MNC. Some business network articles have 
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also modeled the positions of subsidiaries (centers) within MNCs in terms of influence
→
 
(Forsgren & Pahlberg [1992
→
], also Ghoshal & Bartlett [1990
→
])
3
.  
But the works of Ghoshal and Bartlett ([1995
→
], [1997
→
], [1999
→
](with Moran)) also 
take a new path. In their new book on individualized corporations [1997
→
] the emphasis 
is put on changing the main terms used while considering a company. They conclude 
the past paradigm to have been Strategy-Structure-Systems and put forth a new one – 
Purpose-Processes-People. Thereby the hierarchical (macro)structure is left out of their 
focus too, although the accent is a bit different from Hedlund’s works (eg. Hedlund & 
Rolander [1990
→
], where heterarchical (structure) was the base according to which the 
company was handled). 
The works of Burgelman
x
 [1983
→
, 1994
→
] that consider autonomous strategic decisions 
in big corporations are also relevant in this context. These works show that multiple 
layers of management are actually involved in taking strategic decisions. This way the 
managers, who are at first to be considered lower at the organizational drawing board, 
can through their actions be setting strategic directions of the company. An example in 
case being Intel, in which the decisions of middle level managers decided the transferal 
of memory company into a processor company (Burgelman [1994
→
]).  
These works bring forth an example of another issue that is relevant for current work. 
Namely, if we spoke of the three-dimensional MNC, there another set of dimensions 
also could be distinguished. Employees can be considered to be on different authority 
positions(when we use any such formal structure), they can have an action 
position(according to different things that they can really do), and an information 
position(according to the information they possess).
4
  
The case in Burgelman [1994
→
] is an example of how, as Hedlund & Rolander [1990
→
] 
state, the positions on these three dimensions may be not-coinciding. In Intel employees 
could use their position in action dimension and surpass the authority dimension 
                                                          
3
 That is they have derived the internal network position from, amongst other things, the position the 
subsidiary has in its host country local network. 
4
 If Hedlund & Rolander [1990
→
] call these three dimensions the base of a MNC for which the other 
dimension set is a proxy, we continue to operate with MNCs as three-dimensional(with product, 
geographical and functional properties) and just speak of authority, action and information positions of 
different actors. 
 15 
position of superiors for taking a strategic decisions. And, coming back to MNC theory 
development discussion, we can say that the works of Burgelman again imply no 
superior, overarching hierarchy. While speaking of MNCs generally we hereby call 
them heterarchical, as this body of work examined the structural issues in greatest 
detail.  
Analyzing a work that argues for hierarchy (Casson [1994
→
]), it seems that the points 
raised do not contradict with heterarchy works – for example Hedlund [1993→] argues 
that the subordination relations vary and may get switched over time, while Casson 
shows that these relations naturally arise and exist. Accordingly one of the arguments in 
heterarchy works is that hierarchy is only a special case of heterarchy. Also one 
conclusion of the work of Casson is that hierarchy might be best fit for the jobs that 
with the development of technology are going to be performed by computers – that is it 
will best function if taken out of human hands.
5
 
xi
 
Next we are going to consider works that, having their origin at the host country 
viewpoint, address issues relevant for the whole MNC. An example is a stream of 
research initiated by the Science Council of Canada on subsidiary management. One of 
Canadian articles, Poynter & White [1985
→
], discusses organizational slack that 
develops in the subsidiaries. Slack is defined as the excess of total human resources 
after a proper amount has been allocated for the current strategy.  
The work shows that subsidiaries have a natural tendency to generate slack and that it 
can be used for undertaking new value-added activities in subsidiary. This early 
subsidiary work, though, reports the slack being mostly unwanted phenomenon by the 
MNCs
»
, but shows that it cannot be easily dissipated.  
Poynter & White [1985
→
] mention three ways for dissipating subsidiary slack. The first 
is through international human resource transfers. Which is a very important, but 
adversative issue for corporations – for many reasons. Firstly expatriates are important 
transferors of technology between organizational units (Tsang [*1999
→
]).  
                                                          
5
 Heterarchy works suggest that the line of thought might be best suited for Far-Easter countries as it is in 
better accord with their philosophies. It is interesting to note that hierarchy arguments (Casson[1994
→
]) in 
turn state that the (far away?) East might be a better place for the hierarchies to function as the societies 
are less individualistic and therefore more eager to enter subordination relationships there.  
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Also, it is often emphasized that corporate culture is an important tool for heterarchical 
MNCs (eg. Hedlund[1986
→
])
xii
. But as seems to be implied in Humes [1993
→
], creating 
its carriers encompasses breaking different bonds for employees. For better carrying of 
corporate culture an employee would have to be transferred between different functions 
of the company (breaking professional allineation); would have to change its position 
on product dimension; and would have to work internationally. For discussing the last 
point we can say that of the different dimensions important for a person, two are 
national and work related dimension in life. In the interest of corporations is to ensure 
the importance of working. Thereby people would emphasize their corporations 
mission(as their mission in life, while working) and be parts of corporate culture. But 
working internationally for very extensive periods would for those two dimensions 
mean compromising nationality for work.  
We indeed see such cosmopolitian employees – global specialists and global managers – 
working through very international careers and in their case we can say that the work 
dimension is very prevalent. Their existence is also in a way natural, as we speak of 
accelerating environmental change, life-long learning and relearning, and lessening 
importance of the nation state as compared to the corporation (cd. Buckley & Casson 
[1998
→
]).  
Still it is a tendency for most employees to finally settle for their fatherland jobs 
(Poynter & White [1985
→
]) and identify primarily with their home country (Hedlund 
[1986
→
]). It seems that this tendency can be said to be natural, because lessening our 
national identity this way would be pushing ourselves too far, perhaps not only too 
fast*. Subsequently in this thesis majority of employees are considered to be the ‘non-
transferable assets’ of the corporation and thereby one of the very reasons for ownership 
specific assets’ residing in subsidiaries (cd. Birkinshaw & Hood [1998b→]) and for the 
existence of Subsidiary Specific Advantages (SSAs) (cd. Rugman & Verbeke [1999
→
]).  
As for the dissipation of organizational slack the other two ways discussed in Poynter & 
White [1985
→] aren’t also good solutions. Letting people go from their jobs at 
subsidiaries would equip competitors with capable human resources and not letting 
those people take initiatives at all would result in loss of motivation.  
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Consequently the result of Poynter & White [1985
→
] implies that as long as the MNCs 
don’t let their capable subsidiary managers to take initiatives, disharmonies in 
subsidiaries arise. This result is very much alike the ones arrived at in the works that 
consider the whole MNC. In parallel, for instance, the much later work on 
individualized corporations (Ghoshal & Bartlett [1997
→
]) speak of outstanding MNCs 
that (already) are making use of autonomous entrepreneurial frontline managers as 
vehicles of development.  
It therefore seems, that the earlier subsidiary work was simply written in a situation, 
where the environmental changes had already taken place but the corporation had not 
sufficiently responded (as it did not allow for subsidiary slack). Consequently, we can 
see from discussion of this aspect in development of MNC theories, that the subsidiary 
works can point to the same direction as research on entire MNCs. Both bodies spoke of 
a need for leaving subsidiaries with space to operate, be it for example for taking 
initiatives that are discussed in section 2.2. 
6
 
xiii
 
The works of Poynter & White [1985
→
] manifest another important issue – namely that 
we must consider MNCs as multilayered. For example we can consider subsidiaries and 
Regional Headquarters (RHQ) that are built upon them. If going back to our synergy 
creation example in section 1.1
→
, we therein spoke of US subsidiary, where positive 
(production, marketing, R&D) outcomes could be created, then Schütte [1998→] writes 
of production and marketing synergies – in RHQ case instead.  
As Birkinshaw & Hood [1998
→
] note the different layers of management tend to 
compete with each other for influence. In addition to obviously emerging layerings – 
WPM and Divisional Headquarters (DHQ), subsidiary and RHQ – we can also say that 
the Subsidiary General Manager (SGM) forms a layer between the rest of subsidiary 
                                                          
6
 It is hereby argued against (what is done for example in Forsgren and Pedersen[1998
→
]) drawing a harsh 
line between the works that have subsidiary as their point of view and those that consider the whole 
MNC. While it is true, that former can be originated by host country academics they often arrive at 
conclusions that have much to say about the whole corporation. Next to a discussion on organizational 
slack we may consider the works of Birkinshaw [eg. 1997
→
, 1998
→
(with Fry)] on the types of initiatives 
that subsidiaries take. These works find that through initiatives subsidiaries help to address the three 
strategic imperatives that MNCs face: imperatives for global integration, local responsiveness, and 
worldwide learning (cd. Bartlett and Ghoshal[1992
→
]). Moreover, an example of intertwined nature of the 
works is the contribution that Roth & Morrison [1992
→
] make to terminology about heterarchical MNCs. 
They state that through creation of mandates (eg. World Product Mandate) for subsidiaries, MNC 
achieves a state of decentralized-centralization. 
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and its superordinates. In Poynter and White [1985
→
] such position placed SGM in 
crossfire between his subordinates and the HQ and he was therefore an integral part in 
efforts to  resolve the problem of subsidiary slack. 
 
 
From the discussion above we are in conclusion going discuss some important aspects 
for the SGM’s position. We are going to begin with a point touched in the middle of our 
discussion – a point about evolution of MNC theories. The view of MNC as a 
multicentered entity emphasizes the fact that subsidiaries can do much in influencing 
their destiny.  
To bring one example from subsidiary literature, it is said there to be a matter of choice, 
whether we speak of subsidiaries being assigned certain roles, or them (choosing,) 
acquiring strategies for operating (Birkinshaw & Morisson [1995
→
]). Although 
acknowledging that the home country operations tend to play a huge part in MNCs’ 
operations (Ruigrok & van Tulder [1995
→
]) and that there is an ample amount of 
subsidiaries operating only as implementers of head-office instructions (Birkinshaw & 
Hood [1998b
→
]), we still can see changes taking place in that direction (Birkinshaw 
[2000
→
]) pointed by the best practice examples.
7
 
For the SGM, it is important to consider that he has to deal with all the diversity on the 
three-dimensional, partially overlapping structural map – with relations originating from 
subsidiary or coming from outside. Including, for instance, the WPMs and CoEs that 
exist.  
We have to comprehend that very often SGM is the most cosmopolitan employee of the 
subsidiary. He is therefore an important carrier of organization’s culture and, he can 
also be a person on an expatriate assignment. It is therefore also interesting to view his 
authority, action and information position. Having possibly many relationships outside 
the subsidiary might enhance his information and also action position.  
                                                          
7
 As we talked about the fact that there is no superior, overarching hierarchy, this can perhaps be taken as 
one justification for this study to investigating only the SGM layer on geographical dimension.  
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But also within the subsidiary his situation might be interesting. As we are investigating 
the most contributive involvement that SGM can have, the different options as stated by 
Humes [1993
→
] are ranging from executive head and strong operational coordinative 
head to representative head. The interesting issue hereby is whether in case the SGM is 
the former head of an independent country organization, with less authority now, his 
relationships (information and action position) still sufficiently contribute for problems 
investigated in this work. 
In discussing conflicts of interest we will come back to discussion about SGM’s 
position forming a layer of management between subsidiary and the rest of the 
company. In Poynter & White [1985
→
] he was in a position to pass on information 
about preferable change of affairs and help solve problems MNC faced.  
As HQ was setting the state of affairs, but subsidiary worked for a situation that was to 
be beneficial for the whole corporation SGM could draw upon his subordinates’ 
capabilities and utilize his contacts outwards the subsidiary. We can imagine that SGM 
may use his intermediary position to influence other conflict situations that arise.  
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2. INVESTIGATION OF ISSUES OF INTERNAL 
COMPETITION AND KNOWLEDGE SHARING 
 
2.1. A classification of subsidiaries 
There is a quite substantial body of articles identifying strategies that subsidiaries have 
within MNCs. These efforts have had different starting points, for example, D’Cruz 
[1986
→
] investigating decision-making autonomy and market scope; Bartlett & Ghoshal 
[1986
→
] working with local environment importance and subsidiary’s unique 
capabilities; Gupta and Govindarajan [*1991
→
] investigating knowledge flows to and 
from subsidiary in the network of MNC.  
This heterogeneity has provided grounds for studies that systemize previous efforts, as 
is done in Birkinshaw & Morrison [1995
→
]. We can start discussing subsidiary 
strategies with the first of their three types – the local implementer.  
Many subsidiaries have positions in MNCs that are of only marginal importance. If a 
subsidiary is a ‘marketing satellite’ for its corporation, it has minimal employment and, 
as possibilities for growth generally depend on existing resources (Birkinshaw 
[1997
→
]), only a small chance for development. Subsidiary might also be a (‘miniature 
replica’ or) ‘branch plant’, that is, a unit that undertakes the entire relevant range of  
operations in the host country, but does it strictly under specifications from parent 
company (Birkinshaw [1995b
→
]).  
‘Branch plants’ do, however, have a tendency to “implement locally”, thus deviate from 
mother-company’s instructions (D’Cruz [1986→]), and it is thereafter a matter of 
controversy, whether they have exhibited the Not-Invented-Here syndrome (Bartlett & 
Ghoshal [1992
→
]) and lack understanding of the extent of globalization in their industry 
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(Porter [1986
→
], Jeannet [2000
→
]), or have been truly innovational (as for example in 
Birkinshaw [1995b
→
]). 
But for example in North America ‘branch plant’ operations were pre-eminent in 1950s 
and 1960s. Such operations were established in order to provide local content and 
placate host governments, or obtain relief from import tariffs. (Birkinshaw [1996
→
]) 
Globalization, and in particular the dismantling of tariff barriers brought on a process, 
whereby MNCs reorganized on regional or global basis. This process meant a narrower 
product and/or functional scope for subsidiaries, but greater volumes. (Krajewski & 
Blank & Yu [1994
→
])  
The, as we can call it, rationalization-integration of MNCs became a proving-ground for 
ideas of our local implementers, where only worthy innovations prevailed. The 
rationalization process has proceeded more painfully in Europe (Birkinshaw & Fry 
[1998
→
]) across its many countries. Due to a shorter time span, the operations in 
Eastern Europe, especially the many acquired companies, are even further behind. 
As the research question indicates our objective is to study only ‘substantial’ 
subsidiaries, and also those, which are operating in global industries already in an 
integrated manner. Thus we no longer consider the local implementer type of 
subsidiaries and hereafter discuss other types.  
The two types that are important for us are closely akin in the typologies of Birkinshaw 
& Morisson [1995
→
] and Roth & Morrison [1992
→
]. We are hereafter primarily based 
on the latter paper, as it deals with the dimension most relevant for us and concentrates 
exclusively on those types. 
The work of Roth & Morrison [1992
→
] contributes to the strategy discussion by 
concentrating on the extent of autonomy that subsidiaries have. Subsidiaries can be 
Rationalized-Integrated (RI) into MNC, possessing little operational or strategic 
autonomy. The other option is for the subsidiary to be mandated.  
In addition to World Product Mandates discussed, we can see from literature that other 
groupings, than just a single product or product line, can be considered. Humes [1993
→
] 
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speaks of moving divisional headquarters away from home country and Rugman & 
Douglas [1986
→
] consider mandating a strategic business unit (SBU) to a subsidiary.  
As mandates have autonomy in their decisions (from operational to strategic, for 
example in the case of SBU), they can be viewed as another side of the coin of 
Rationalizing-Integrating. They are the controlling part in the relationship.
8
  
It is worth emphasizing that, as was implied in the discussion of MNCs’ divergent 
structural map, one has to allow for a sub-subsidiary level of analysis. As, for example, 
different parts of subsidiary have working relationships along different divisional lines, 
the autonomy level can there also vary (see D’Cruz [1986→], Birkinshaw[1997→]). 
More recently, it is also evident from Holm & Pedersen [2000
→
], who note that it has 
become increasingly important to considered reciprocal interdependencies that 
subsidiaries have. Thereby one controls some activities, but is dependent in case of 
others (cf. for example the case discussed in Forsgren & Mathisen & Pedersen 
[2000
→
]). 
For the purpose of clarification we are going to differentiate the case of headquarters 
from the above. It can be distinguished by the extent of control possessed over external 
activities – for example if a product mandate often only controls sales operations 
concerned, then headquarters of a big division has a range of value-added activities in 
multiple countries.  
But also the ratio of being controlled/being controller differs as headquarters is 
dominantly the controlling party and not as much interdependent. As a conclusion we 
can note that by discussing some works, and a systematization effort, on subsidiary 
strategies we have picked out the most relevant dimension – autonomy – for our further 
work. We also discussed some basic selection criteria for picking subsidiaries to study 
as situation of MNCs is changing.  
 
                                                          
8
 It is not predetermined, however, that the mandated subsidiary will be better off than the rationalized-
integrated one. For example D’Cruz [1986→] speaks of instances, where subsidiaries are assigned WPMs 
for products that are at the tail ends of their respective life-cycles, and also brings as an example the Big 
Three automakers’ (General Motors, Ford and Chrysler ) subsidiaries in Canada, which have very 
favorable assignments to fulfill.  
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2.2. Internal competition in MNCs 
If day-to-day operations in subsidiaries can be considered as static, then dynamism in 
subsidiaries’ existence occurs, when subsidiary develops its capabilities and thereby 
enhances its position within the corporation. From an emergent line of research that 
considers the development of subsidiaries (eg. Luineks [1999
→
]) we are specifically 
interested in the process of capability enhancement. As is evident form ensuing 
discussion, in the working of MNCs the best way for ensuring enhancement of 
capabilities is for subsidiary to take entrepreneurial action.  
As entrepreneurship in MNCs has been in the focus of interest (eg. Ghoshal & Bartlett 
[1997
→
], Birkinshaw [2000
→
]), both of its forms have received attention. If MNCs can 
use internal corporate venturing (Burgelman [1983
→
]), by creating divisions with a 
specific mission for innovation; then we are more interested in the phenomenon of  
intrapreneurship (Ghoshal & Bartlett [1997
→
]), whereby all members of an organization 
are expected act on emerging opportunities.  
Birkinshaw [1997
→
] has studied entrepreneurial action that subsidiaries are engaging in, 
namely initiatives that are taken. It is interesting to note that initiatives are primarily 
distinguished by the level of autonomy that facilitated them. A high level of autonomy 
(and correspondingly* low parent-subsidiary communication) provides means for 
external initiatives on the marketplace, whereas low autonomy (and high 
communication) is characteristic of internal (within the MNC) opportunity spotting and 
subsequent gain of locating the operation to the subsidiary.
 9
 
It has been widely documented that subsidiaries of MNCs engage in internal 
competition (eg.* Krajewski & Blank & Yu [1994
→
], Galunic & Eisenhardt [*1996
→
], 
look relatedly: conflicts of interest between two subsidiaries in 1.1.), and it is easy to 
see, how initiatives provide means for that. On the one hand internal initiatives exactly 
comprise out-competing a sister unit for an activity, already performed or upcoming. On 
                                                          
9
 The level of autonomy should not stay permanently fixed, however. An example can be seen in a case 
discussed in Birkinshaw [1995
→
] about a subsidiary unit that produced fan and limit control devices in 
furnaces. It was at first manufacturing at small volumes. As managers discovered inefficient operations of 
producing its most complex component (switch) in home country, they redesigned it and the subsidiary 
gained that activity. Years later it subsequently succeeded in gaining rights for the whole volume of that 
product – and thus gained autonomy.  
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the other hand competitive position can also be enhanced by external initiatives, when 
they extend the market scope beyond host country (in the process also possibly 
manifesting subsidiary’s early recognition of globalization potential in the industry – cd. 
Hout & Porter & Rudden [1982
→
]). 
Study of such processes in corporations has led to MNCs being defined as operating 
with internal markets (Birkinshaw [2000
→
], see also similar points in Buckley & Casson 
[1998
→]) in which corporate headquarters’ role is to define the rules of the game and 
also make certain corporate level strategic decisions. Increased competition is said to be 
evident from broad use of internal benchmarking and performance league tables, or 
operations of internal investment agencies.  
We can comprehend the competitive atmosphere that arises, as the initiative taker in the 
case described in previous end-note (fan and limit control device) professed that he was 
certainly not welcome to the home country unit after successfully challenging their 
production of switches. In conclusion a final point has to be made about SGM. Namely, 
its role in achieving subsidiary’s competitiveness has been observed to be great, as he 
has usually been an important driver in initiative processes (Birkinshaw [1995b
→
]).  
 
2.3. Centre-of-Excellence type knowledge sharing in MNCs 
Alongside conceptualizations about internal markets that are run in MNCs, we are 
witnessing a great emphasis that is being put on achieving widespread sharing and trust 
in organizations. When in the process of developing subsidiary capabilities leading edge 
solutions arise, it becomes a natural objective to disseminate these throughout the 
corporation (see for example Andersson & Holmström [2000→]).  
In the literature about knowledge transfer and organizational learning great emphasis is 
put on development of effective information technology solutions and work of mobile 
managers, who travel 200 plus days a year ‘cross-pollinating’ ideas and are role models 
for reaching across organizational boundaries. Organizational culture needed for such 
processes is characterized as open, based on fairness and shared values.  
 25 
While surpassing examples can be accounted in service industries – for example 
consulting company McKinsey– industrial firms such as IKEA are also very impressive. 
(Ghoshal & Bartlett [1997
→
], but see also Hedlund & Ridderstrale [1995
→
]* for 
projects of international cooperation and ) 
For analyzing such best practice transferal, we are going to use the concept of Centre-
of-Excellence. The subsidiary mentioned previously (in section 1.1.) was 3M Sweden, 
which had leading edge capabilities in customer focused marketing and key account 
management. Subsequently being recognized for them and actively helping out other 
units (Birkinshaw [2000
→
]), this subsidiary exemplifies a knowledge disseminator in a 
MNC.  
In this work the term CoE is strictly differentiated from WPM. If the latter exemplifies 
competitiveness of subsidiary, the fact that it has gained itself the right to be the 
proprietor of certain activities; then CoE is for us a manifestation of the sharing that is 
also to take place.  
It should be noted, that as may be the case with relatively new terms (for example also 
to some extent true for WPM), it has not yet been refined and a latitude of definitions 
exist. For the reasons mentioned, our use of the concept is more in line with Moore & 
Birkinshaw [1998
→
], than with Forsgren & Mathisen & Pedersen [2000
→
] or Bartlett & 
Ghoshal [1986
→
].
10
 
The internal market perspective (Birkinshaw [2000
→
]) has also discussed the 
phenomenon of knowledge transfer. In that perspective corporations are said to have 
internal market of capabilities, one that operates without competition and without fees 
charged for servicing.
xiv
  
Although it is briefly suggested that corporations like HP or Ericsson do a feasible job 
at sharing at the same time with competing, it still seems to be the point in the internal 
markets concept worth scrutiny. There is also another work that emphasizes cooperation 
within MNCs, as opposed to internal market competition. Such is the work of 
                                                          
10
 It should therefore be clarified, concerning Figure 1, that mandates can be given exercising control also 
on functional dimension (R&D mandates for instance). 
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Eisenhardt & Galunic [2000] on coevolving systems. There the focus is more on sharing 
and internal competition receives less attention. 
Thus at large – the issue of how units (subsidiaries) simultaneously compete and share 
knowledge is worth investigating. And in conclusion about knowledge sharing it should 
be emphasized, that SGM’s role here is important (similarly to mobile managers). He 
can utilize his contacts and participation in various task forces or committees to achieve 
greater leverage of capabilities in MNCs.  
 
 
The overview of literature has indicated that subsidiaries, having different relationships 
on the divergent structural map of the MNC, are required to fulfill contradictory roles of 
being internally competitive and sharing knowledge at the same time. The justified role 
of the Subsidiary General Manager can be investigated in the light of this balancing 
effort, as there is previous evidence of this layer of management being active in 
resolving conflicting situations in MNCs.  
While referring symbolically back to Figure 1 we can say that our research problem was 
to investigate geographical dimension’s (that is, Subsidiary General Manager’s post on 
it) role in balancing internal competition, as manifested by a succedent World Product 
Mandate gainer (drawn on product dimension), with knowledge sharing as displayed by 
a Centre-of-Excellence (on functional dimension). In investigating this issue, we can 
say that SGM has an important part both, in internal competition, as well as achieving a 
state of sharing knowledge.  
Our expectation is that in case he has such strong authority position in subsidiary, he 
can also help to find the balance between the two. Therefore we can put forth a:  
 
Hypothesis: A strong authority position of SGM has a positive effect on finding a 
balance between internal competition and knowledge sharing in subsidiary. 
We can expect the situation in various parts of subsidiary (or between) subsidiaries to 
differ according to the level of autonomy from operations in other countries, as there are 
direct consequences for position in internal competing. If SGM has had expatriate 
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experience, his action and information positions in the MNC may be enhanced, carrying 
over to the present issue. Also SGM’s information and action position should be 
considered in the light of subsidiary history – that is, if he formerly headed subsidiary as 
an independent country organization his previously developed relationships may still be 
of use. 
As the way this process finally maps out is still not clear, there is a need for an in-depth 
explorative case study to provide answers to questions such as “how” or “why” (cf. 
Andersson & Holmström [2000→]). A qualitative study is characterized by the close 
relation between the researcher and the entities of the study object (Holme & Solvang 
[1991]). 
Interviews were chosen because of the flexibility of the method. By gathering 
information through interviews there is a possibility to follow up if needed and there is 
also space for opinions and ideas from the respondents. Personal contact between the 
respondent and the interviewer is also assumed to affect the respondent’s interest in 
answering the questions in a positive way. (Bell [1990]) 
In the next chapter the results of an empirical study of two Estonian subsidiaries of 
leading European MNC are presented. The multinationals operate in global industries 
and are already integrated into the network of their MNCs. In total nine interviews, each 
lasting for about an hour, were conducted. People chosen were managers of different 
functions in the companies. Questions used were open-ended leaving space for thoughts 
and ideas from respondents. One of the companies considered it useful to have a 
number of general questions sent upfront, the questionnaire used is presented in 
unchanged form in Appendix 1. 
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3. EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF ESTONIAN 
SUBSIDIARIES 
 
3.1. Overview of subsidiaries 
We are next going to give an overview of the companies examined in our case study. 
Thus we will look at the different characteristics that subsidiaries have and the 
implications for our study. After that we move on to present the case material collected, 
analyze that and draw conclusions. The information concerning subsidiaries comes 
mainly from the MNCs’ as well as subsidiaries’ websites. Additional sources of 
information are the annual business reports of the companies. Also some information 
comes from press releases and newspaper articles. Thus this sub-section consists of 
secondary data regarding the subsidiaries as next presents the primary data (cd Bell 
[1993]). 
A 15 billion $ sales and 880 million $ profit MNC Akzo Nobel operates in 75 countries 
and employs 67000 people. The company is from Sweden and the Netherlands. 
Diversified conglomerate is active in following areas: pharmaceuticals, coatings and 
chemicals. Its Estonian coatings subsidiary ES Sadolin has 640 million EEK in sales 
turning 114 million EEK profit. While MNC’s main decorative coatings brands are 
Sadolin, Crown, Marshall, Maestro, and Pinotex, Estonian subsidiary sells Sadolin, 
Pinotex, Casco, Synteko and Akzo Nobel brands. 
ES Sadolin’s production facilities of more than hundred (out of 170) employees are 
located in Rapla. ES Sadolin has ISO9001 certificate of quality. 
Although AkzoNobel’s is the biggest market share worldwide, it constitutes to only 8% 
of the total. As the world market is segmented we are going to look at our national 
markets separately. 
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ES Sadolin’s home market of paints-laquers (of 7 million liters) has three bigger 
participants: ES Sadolin (ca. 35% marketshare), AS Vivacolor (ca. 35%) and AS Eskaro 
(13%). As an example of the subsidiary’s achievements on home market, in 2001 it 
achieved the third place in Äripäev’s Construction Materials’ Producers Top50. 
Company feels itself to be most akin with AS Vivacolor (Baltic Color AS), a member of 
industry that is also a MNC subsidiary. 
ES Sadolin mainly sells its products on Estonian (25% of the turnover), Latvian (15%), 
Lithuanian and Ukrainian (together 20% of the turnover) and Russian market, the last 
accounting for 40% of the turnover. The subsidiary is not solely concentrating on the 
home market as Ukrainian and Russian markets have highest growth potential. This 
makes it all but natural that subsidiary has a strong tie for first in home market, but has 
not achieved a dominant position. In Russia it has positioned itself in the middle niche 
of the market, the company is active in its marketing efforts advertising Sadolin in 
national television channel. If in Russian market over the last two years focus was on 
selling Pinotex coatings then now attention has shifted to Sadolin brand. 
The subsidiary can thus be considered MNC’s RHQ for greater part of the former 
USSR. In markets allocated to ES Sadolin its marketing responsibilities cover both self 
manufactured products and products of sister subsidiaries. Russian market was earlier 
supplied by Estonian and Swedish products, then after the opening of Russian factory 
the market is being supplied locally (see below on the factory). 
In 2002 the subsidiary also started exporting decorative coating Pinotex to Northern 
Europe – Denmark, Sweden and Norway. Additional export markets accounted for 14% 
of the turnover and 150 new products were introduced in the process. 
Subsidiary is already integrated into operations of the MNC, as for instance alkyd resins 
produced in Estonian factory are supplied as a production input to subsidiaries in 
Finland, Cyprus, Oman and Sudan.  
As implied by extending geographical coverage the subsidiary has expanded its 
production over time. In the beginning of 2002 the MNC relocated part of its Danish 
operations to Estonia. As a result subsidiary’s turnover rose greatly – 25% when 
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compared with the previous year – making that the second straight most successful year 
ever. 
Subsidiary has also expanded in other functions besides production. In the middle of 
2002 ES Sadolin received 10 million EEK in investments from mothercompany with an 
objective to develop its R&D laboratory in Rapla.  
The R&D structure of Akzo Nobel consist of a few central laboratories which carry out 
the fundamental research (in Netherlands, Great Britain and the USA) and regional 
R&D units which apply fundamental research in order to create products. The goal of 
the subsidiary is to develop into a development center for our region (although next to 
Eastern Europe and Russia South-Eastern Asia and North Africa are also mentioned as 
recipients of services) as not all western concepts are directly applicable here due to cost 
considerations.  
The core competency of the subsidiary is woodcare products with another goal in 
developing alkyds. There, the consistency of organic solvents will soon be regulated in 
EU, which calls for development of new types of solvents. R&D department that 
employs 27 scientists from TTU recently received an addition of two scientists with 
high academic degree.  
Part of subsidiary’s expansion has also been geographical expansion of production. In 
June 2002 ES Sadolin started operating a factory in Russia, near Moscow, which will 
produce decorative coatings (water-based paints). The annual volume of the factory is 
10 million liters. The factory is part of ES Sadolin’s business-unit structure; the newly 
appointed CEO will spend more than half of the year in Russia. The factory is expected 
to break even in 2005/2006.  
Russian facilities cover an area of 7300 m² and include laboratory, warehousing 
facilities, administrative offices and manufacturing; the staff employed is expected to 
increase from 50 to 80 over the next three years. 
From Russian operations we can also see an example of R&D performed in the 
subsidiary – as there is a brand that was developed specifically for production for 
Russian market.  
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Besides expansion of its sphere of influence within the MNC, the subsidiary also has 
cooperative relationships with other sister units. As an example we can consider another 
instance of R&D – cooperation with Italian subsidiary. The result of that project was 
development of a line of coatings used in renovating facades of historical buildings. 
According to Reile ES Sadolin has benefited a lot from information of the MNC – in 
areas of marketing as in technology – implying cooperative movement of knowledge. 
Although there is a need to follow MNC’s policies, Reile says that ES Sadolin is free in 
its decisions, thus opening a possibility for competitive initiatives. 
French MNC Saint-Gobain is amongst the 100 biggest companies in the world 
recording 30 billion EUR in sales and one billion in EUR in profits. Its subsidiaries 
reside in 46 countries employing 170 500 people. Saint-Gobain is active in the 
following areas: glass, housing and high performance materials. It is the worldwide and 
European leader in all of its business areas. The MNC’s peculiarity in the study is in the 
fact that it has four loosely associated subsidiaries in Estonia. The MNC has invested 
470 million EEK creating over 300 jobs.  
We are mainly going to be concerned with the oldest subsidiary – Saint-Gobain 
Sekurit Eesti AS (SGSEST)– that was created in 1989 in Elva. Its sales are 140 million 
EEK, profit 30 million EEK and it employs 160 people. The subsidiary belongs to 
Saint-Gobain Sekurit that is active in automotive glazing. 
Sekurit produces mainly windscreens and side windows for the spare parts market of 
cars. Two thirds of the sales come from windscreens. On the world market the biggest 
producer of automotive glazing is Pilkington of UK (Represented by Klaasiteeninduse 
AS in Estonia). In Estonia Saint-Gobain is more prevalent as it produces more for 
European cars.
 
There are 300 types of windscreens and close to thousand types of side windows in 
production at once (for basically all more common cars). Producing such a big number 
different parts assumes very good logistics within the factory and also control over the 
technological process. 
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While describing the subsidiary’s role in the MNC and its strategy Kasak has said that 
Sekurit is a flexible subsidiary that is able to effectively produce small runs of 
production. Subsidiary produces mainly for European market, but some of its products 
also reach America, Asia and Africa through intermediary warehouses of the MNC. 
 
The biggest clients are Mercedes and Renault (but also, for instance, some models of 
Porsche), which send products to their chains selling spare parts. The MNC’s 
subsidiaries in the respective area are active in 24 countries around the world with 
central warehouse residing in Belgium. Sekurit exports 96 percent of its products (95% 
of windscreens and 99% of side windows) – to 15 countries.  
In 2002 the MNC invested 25 million in order to renew the production of windscreens. 
As there is a trend in the industry to provide higher value-added products (including 
mirror clamps and rain sensors etc.) in the beginning of this year the subsidiary started 
making extruded glass, which attaches to the car with a polymer that acts also as a 
gasket. The area of production facilities allocated for producing windscreens was 
doubled in 2002 and correspondingly the number of laminated windscreens produced 
doubled.  
In total the project of expanding the production of windscreens has cost 70 million in 
investments. The cumulative investments of mothercompany have been over 200 
millions.  
Previous to that an expansion of the subsidiary took place in the second half of 2000 as 
it subsidiary started operating a new 70 million factory producing side windows 
(including annealed side windows). As the technology used for producing annealed side 
windows differs totally from that used for producing laminated windscreens the 
expansion process was complex. When this factory opened subsidiary also started 
cutting glass, as before production inputs were already pre-cut to meet specific 
measurements.  
At the time of this production expansion Kasak underlined it being a result of the great 
confidence that the MNC has in Estonian subsidiary also mentioning the cost 
effectiveness of producing in Estonia. When the factory opened operations Kasak also 
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spoke of plans of starting to produce rear windows. He stated subsidiary’s objective to 
be doubling 1999 94 million in sales in the next couple of years.  
Also as an expansion of production the subsidiary has for two years produced glazing 
for Volvo’s road construction vehicles. This production input does not go to spare parts 
chains, but directly to clients’ production process. The subsidiary started production of 
laminated windscreens started in 1991.  
Subsidiary’s production facilities cover an area of 12 000 m², side windows facility 
allocating 5000 m². From 1998 the products carry mothercompany’s brandname 
Sekurit. Production of windscreens and annealed side windows is certified according to 
ISO 9001 – 2000 standards. Annealed side windows and laminated windscreens comply 
with European regulation R43 and safety standard ANSI of the USA.  
Isover Eesti is a selling outlet of insulation materials with 137 million in sales and 2.4 
million in profits. There are 20 employees. It also sells suspended ceilings and is active 
in Tallinn and Tartu. Products are brought from Finland and Sweden, but also from the 
Great Britain, Poland and Czech Republic. The MNC leadership in its respective 
markets has carried over to Estonia. 
Autover Autoklaas is active in installing automotive glazing (mainly in Tallinn and 
Tartu) with sales of 25 million, profits 1.9 million and 18 employees. It resells Sekurit’s 
products and also implements projects in cooperation with insurance companies Seesam 
and ERGO. Company also delivers Sekurit’s products to other car dealerships and other 
Autover companies in Baltics, exports accounting for 15% of the sales. In 2001 
company invested 7.5 million to a new dealership.  
Baltiklaas produces insulated glass and has sales worth 105 million and 70 employees. 
The markets of subsidiary are Estonia, Latvia and Skandinavia. The total investments of 
the MNC into Baltiklaas is 40 million. From the beginning of the year company also 
produces annealed glass, this product is intended for intra MNC use and moves to other 
subsidiaries. In 2000, when sales of the subsidiary were around 50 million it produced 
roughly 100 000 m² of insulated glass.  
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3.2. Results of case study interviews 
Presenting the results of the interviews we are at first going to look at the individual 
steps of development of ES Sadolin. As can be seen in table 1 subsidiary began its 
operations in 1984 and we are going to start with that situation to show the contrast with 
the state of operations as of now. 
T A B L E 1  
Steps of ES Sadolin’s development. 
Time Facility ench. Output Sales 
1984 Paint plant I 1000T  
1989 Alkyd plant I   
 Laboratory I   
1992   45 million EEK 
1994 Paint plant II 3984T  
1996 Alkyd plant II   
1997 Laboratory II 13013T 530 million EEK 
1998 Warehouse   
1999  9317T 332 million EEK 
2001 Service house 12305T 517 million EEK 
2002 ICD 20000T 600 million EEK 
2003 Tank farm   
Source: Intranet of ES Sadolin. 
In 1984 only production took place locally. As in the Soviet system there were heavy 
constraints on getting convertible currency it was impossible to buy production inputs 
from Akzo Nobel’s other subsidiaries or from any other Western company and sell end 
products for Soviet rubles. Thus the Finnish sister subsidiary was sent samples of a 
range of possibly suitable production inputs and assigned R&D responsibilities with a 
goal of developing ES Sadolin’s products. 
In 1989 subsidiary started both alkyd resins production and R&D activities. As alkyd 
resins were previously shown as an example of integration into MNC’s internal 
network, this point can now be further discussed.  
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Alkyd resins are an intermediary production input for solvent based coatings. In the 
internal network that the MNC operates, subsidiaries have an ample amount of freedom 
to choose their own partner subsidiaries. Right now the subsidiary has a threefold 
distinction for its alkyd products. Alkyd resin can either be used for the production of 
coatings within the subsidiary (primary market), sold as an intermediate input to sister 
subsidiaries (secondary market) or sold through open market transactions (on tertiary 
market).  
Next to alkyd resins the subsidiary produces wood care products and paints. These are 
primarily variable cost driven as adding workforce and increasing productivity enables 
greater volumes. Production of alkyds, on the other hand, relies on chemical processes 
taking fixed amount of time in a reactor. The production is thus fixed cost driven.  
In 1996 the subsidiary expanded its alkyd production by adding the second reactor. By 
now volumes have reached 6 million liters, next to the amount of 12 million liters wood 
care products and paints produced. Due to the fixed costs driving the production the 
subsidiary begins with satisfying its primary market’s needs and uses secondary and 
tertiary markets only when excess capacities exist. On average the subsidiary exports 2 
million liters of alkyds.  
When an MNC enters emerging markets, such as has been the case of ES Sadolin, there 
at once open up necessities for cooperative development (cf. eg. Kronzell & Übi & 
Danell & Kivistik [1999]). Throughout the steps of its development ES Sadolin has also 
benefited much from the know-how of the mothercompany. First and foremost, it 
produces coatings that are sold to the end user under Akzo Nobel trademarks. Thus it 
has ‘imported’ technology – using the same equipment just as well as receipts for 
making coatings.  
An example of know-how being received can be brought from marketing department’s 
development, though finance has also received help. In marketing, producing the first 
coatings besides USSR’s oil based coatings gave the company a good head start. First 
marketing works were created basically unmodified from Swedish and Danish 
campaigns. Marketing developed as corporations from Sweden and the Netherlands 
merged. Marketing was reporting to Sweden and also received an expatriate from there 
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in the middle of 90s. This employee had very big (Swedish) influence on the way 
marketing was carried out, and she created basic principles some of which are still in 
place. Thus in 1994 ES Sadolin was amongst the first (with Saku and Coca-Cola) to 
start brand building. The corporate training programs attended throughout the 
development basically are of generally educational nature.  In around 1998 marketing 
concepts were reviewed by Estonians, the focus had also started to shift to Russian 
market. In 1998 the MNC reorganized and marketing was now guided by international 
marketing team from the very competitive market Great Brittain. International 
marketing team gives the subsidiary latitude of freedom – as only things like trademarks 
and logos are under corporate control – and also provides new ideas. Still it is 
customary to share some of the responsibility by coordinating bigger campaigns.  
There is very much know-how available within the MNC marketing wise. Thus, for 
instance, one successful marketing campaign was created after employees had gone to 
Danish subsidiary and reviewed the marketing archives there, finding an exactly 
applicable body of work.  
Another area, where ties with the mothercompany are of benefit is the possibility to use 
different corporate level software packages. Examples of those are R&D software and 
software that handles materials safety card, automatically adjusting for regulatory acts 
updates made in different countries.  
But the above discussed production of alkyds for the internal markets also brings us to 
the competition issues within the MNC. As generally effectiveness and quickness of 
fulfilling orders are key on the MNC’s internal markets, ES Sadolin considers 
maintaining its price-quality ratio a ‘backbone’ to being competitive in its secondary 
alkyds market. 
The possible competition within the multinational always has two sides to it. On the one 
hand there is always a possibility to become competitive cost-wise and thus earn a right 
to certain production operations. On the other hand there is always corporate politics 
involved, ensuring that operations in different countries do not completely cease to 
exist, be it already for the sunk costs involved. Thus even as the Estonian operation can 
manufacture at roughly a third of costs incurred in Sweden, there is still only a gradual 
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relocation of operations. While looking at the steps of development that ES Sadolin has 
gone through, we see these almost always being results of local initiative. The process 
of expanding its markets was taken although the corporation had considered it too risky.  
A good example of development of operations can once again be brought from alkyd 
resins. At first ES Sadolin learned producing it from the Finnish subsidiary – as much as 
necessary to fulfill its own needs. Now as the export has started, Finland is the major 
importer of alkyds. Estonian operations have proved to be able to provide the necessary 
quality while remaining at a lower cost level becoming a supplier to the subsidiary once 
giving the know-how.  
In neighboring subsidiaries there are many operations producing alkyds. The production 
takes place for instance in Sweden and Poland. The Polish alkyd production is an 
example of a subsidiary being less efficient, as the factory was set up during planned 
economy period. Production of alkyds will likely cease there.   
Another set of operations that is right now taking place in ES Sadolin, is the production 
that was relocated from the Danish subsidiary. This brings us an example, where 
different cost factors, resulting in decreasing sales numbers, in the end clearly out-
weighed the corporate level politics of keeping the investment alive. The operations that 
by now have been shut down were located in the center of Copenhagen’s city. Over 
time location became more and more expensive. There were also raising environmental 
standards to be met, also contributing to costs.  
Akzo Nobel has an interesting tool for dealing with the competitive performance of the 
subsidiaries. From the one hand it can be directly measured – for example cost wise. As 
was mentioned earlier, in the internal network of the company markets are created. But 
the markets do not only concern subsidiaries being in partnership with each other. For 
example marketing subunits of the corporation are also given a freedom to decide, from 
which subsidiary they source the products sold. 
A competitive measure used within the multinational is the annual benchmarking. For 
example top level managers in ES Sadolin are responsible for carrying out 
benchmarking of logistics and production. Throughout the corporation measures such as 
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productivity, cost price etc. are created. In Estonian subsidiary benchmarks declined 
after relocation of Danish operations as ES Sadolin started producing some small 
batches. In the end, when the full effect of increasing turnover was realized benchmarks 
returned to their good levels.  
The peculiarity of Akzo Nobel’s benchmarking system is in the fact that it also 
facilitates the other side of our research problem – knowledge sharing as subsidiaries 
are parts of the same company. In the multinational there are forums held. Once a 
subsidiary has proved its superiority in internal benchmarking, forums aim to highlight 
the ‘simple but ingenious’ solutions that it has come up with. 
While speaking of formations similar to Center Of Excellences, we may say that during 
the forums ‘temporary COE’s are created with a goal of disseminating the created ‘best 
performance’ examples. Employees from the contributing subsidiary are given 
expatriate assignments. Thus within the scheme of internal benchmarking the need to 
find a balance between internal competition and knowledge sharing is addressed. One 
example of such best performance dispersal comes from the Turkish subsidiary, and on 
the level of the multinational such examples of cooperation are numerous.  
There are also other examples of cooperative sharing taking place within the 
multinational. In Akzo Nobel there are horizontal connections formed (directly between 
the lower level employees) during the joint training programs abroad, such as process 
safety trainings ES Sadolin’s employees recently took part in. ES Sadolin also takes 
pride in the fact that in a recently organized worldwide training program concerning 
marketing on emerging markets subsidiary’s employee was asked to contribute his 
expertise as a best practice case. ES Sadolin’s marketing manager has been asked to 
contribute with his lectures on Business Principles, including Business Ethics, etc.  
The multinational also forms permanent horizontal bodies – committees – to address 
business needs. Thus, for instance, marketing manager of wood-care products takes part 
in biannually meeting committee of colleagues, where fresh ideas, changes in packaging 
standards and new products are discussed.  
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The top R&D manager of the subsidiary heads a group responsible for alkyds 
development on the level of Decorative Coatings throughout the world. The group’s 
responsibilities include providing accessibility of information concerning latest 
developments and acting on local needs in order to provide responsiveness. The group 
mainly communicates electronically, but also tri-annual meetings are held. Another 
example of cooperation in R&D is the Decorative Coatings R&D managers’ working 
group, where Estonians also participate.  
When needed lateral connections help overcome critical situations. For example as in 
case when in another subsidiary one part of production operations had come to a halt 
and Estonian subsidiary produced the necessary output and sent it to its destination 
within the multinational.  
While considering the structure of the multinational we saw different layers on which 
the internal market operated. As the subsidiaries were able to choose their own partners 
for intermediate inputs, marketing units were on a lower level free to switch the sources 
of products they sell. Another facet of Akzo Nobel’s structure is the differentiation 
between the legal structure and the operative structure. An example of this is ES 
Sadolin’s relationship with the sister factory in Moscow.  
Legally, that is, ownership wise ES Sadolin and Dekor are entirely separated, both 
being owned by the mothercompany. But as was said in the introduction Estonian 
subsidiary is a regional headquarters for the greater part of the former USSR market. 
Akzo Nobel uses its operational structure, or ‘virtual structure’, to create the Baltics-
Russia-Ukraine sub-business unit (SBU). On such virtual level ES Sadolin’s employees 
manage the region. Thus for example a person from Estonian subsidiary is assigned 
chief-executive-officer duties of the Moscow facilities and marketing personnel reports 
directly to ES Sadolin’s head of marketing.  
As an example of the structure of a legal entity and its relation to virtual structure we 
can consider the structure of Moscow’s subsidiary (which is in its essence same as ES 
Sadolin’s structure) and subordination relations of SBUs marketing function. The legal 
entity in Russia has following departments: Marketing, Sales, Site, Finances, Human 
Resources, General Administration. One employee working in the marketing 
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department is at the same time part of the Baltics, Russia & Ukraine sub-business unit. 
The marketing in SBU level is basically divided into two: product management and 
advertising. In product management maintenance technicians are from Estonia and so is 
for instance the manager of product Sadolin – which is produced in Rapla. But the 
Russian employee (from Dekor’s marketing department) manages marketing of the 
product Maestro, which is produced in Moscow. The other side of SBU marketing – 
advertising – divides responsibilities on geographical basis, and there the same Russian 
employee also has general advertising responsibility for her country. Employees from 
Latvian and Lithuanian legal entities, for example, have responsibilities for their 
country.  
At large the structure of Akzo Nobels Coatings Group is divided into business units 
product wise. Sub-business units are constituents of thereof (see Appendix 2). ES 
Sadolin’s Baltics, Russia & Ukraine operates alongside such SBUs as South-America 
(Brazil and Argentina), Asia-Pacific (Indonesia, Vietnam, China), Central-Europe 
(Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia) and South-Africa (in a separate business unit 
because of cultural reasons) in Decorative Coatings International business unit. In 
contrast to that geographical orientation Decorative Coatings (Western) Europe is 
segmented on functional basis. Akzo Nobel also uses product dimension separation – 
for instance as in Resins business unit in Chemicals Group. The business units in the 
Coatings Group include: Car Refinishers, Industrial Finishers, Industrial Products, 
Powder Coatings, Marine and Protective Coating, Decorative Coatings Europe, 
Decorative Coatings International.  
As ES Sadolin supplies the region with the MNC’s products, production in Estonian and 
Russian factories does not coincide. The Russian operations add the production of 
water-based paints to the region. Already during this year two new products especially 
for Russian markets have been introduced. From one side ES Sadolin considers Russian 
factory to be colleagues. On the other hand the two plants also have a kind of a potential 
competition going on between them – with a drive to perform better and enhance their 
value chain. 
The fact that Estonians were given an opportunity to operate the Russian factory is an 
example of development of the subsidiary. The Russian factory was not profitable at 
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first, also its trademark was not well known. People at ES Sadolin have daily contacts 
with Russian factory. Right now Russian factory has a very good quality control 
laboratory and the transfer of receipts from Sweden has been successful. It should also 
be mentioned that the person building up the Russian factory for four years was an 
Estonian expatriate.  
Estonian operations have also expanded by starting to produce for North European 
markets. The tempo of growth of the subsidiary has been quick. Mothercompany has 
invested ca. 150 million EEK over amortization of money here, adding know-how to 
that. There have been no unsuccessful expansions in ES Sadolin during its existence.   
For production to Western markets (that makes up 30% of Rapla factory’s volume), 
receipts of products have been learned by the plants, thus in that area, no R&D in 
traditional sense has taken place. Also the trademarks of the products sold do not belong 
to marketing units of ES Sadolin. In this sense one could call production to North 
Europe’s markets a subcontracting to sister subsidiaries. Subsidiary hopes to stay 
successful in expanding its production on expense of Northern Europe, based on its 
indicators.  
The highest growth markets – Russia and Ukraine also represent a possibilities for the 
subsidiary. Thus, for example, ES Sadolin has right now land in excess capacity, as 
growth is anticipated there.  
ES Sadolin’s marketing department mainly sells products from such subsidiaries as 
Finland, Sweden, Poland, and Turkey. But smalls sets of decorative paints also come 
from countries such as the Netherlands. Both levels of internal market – marketing unit 
and intermediate product sourcing – work as basically open markets. If prices dictate 
outside partners may be used. 
As a general rule partners are found within a 1000-kilometer radius – due to 
transportation considerations. An example of a partnership formed is the fact that the 
SBU sells one traditionally strong Polish trademark in Lithuania, with production of 
which it has nothing to do with. Another example is a complex arrangement, in which 
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the paint is produced in Sweden, transported to Estonia and then re-decanted and packed 
here.  
There are several ways for forming partnerships on internal markets. According to 
managers of ES Sadolin during the first four to five years of employment one can build 
up a reliable network of contacts – as top management in the multinational is stable over 
time. One can use contacts of ones contact person. Also, there is a good possibility to 
find such information from the MNC’s intranet. In addition there are ombudsmen 
assigned for such purposes in the corporation.  
It can be said that R&D units are also operating on internal markets. As the structure of 
Decortive Coatings International is geographically based there is R&D work that is 
doubled and there is a necessity to specialize further. But already there are different 
subsidiaries having strength in different areas. Thus for instance the subsidiaries of 
Turkey and Brazil are advanced in paints, as ES Sadolin is strong in wood care 
products, also alkyds.  
In R&D market, there is a possibility to develop competencies of subsidiary and 
subsequently receive corporate level investments. After that other subsidiaries will start 
buying R&D services from the developer. This is also a tool for achieving specialization 
of R&D. An example of providing services is the R&D department of Danish 
subsidiary, which has specialized after the production relocation. Now it provides 
corporate clients with research concerning microbiology. (R&D services are paid for be 
becoming a co-contributor in yearly budget of the lab or sometimes also through one 
time bills. This also depends on weather the lab is a part of producing subsidiary or just 
standalone.) 
There are a number of corporate level Centers Of Excellence – such as for wood care 
products, toners and laquers. ES Sadolin’s wood care services are perhaps not as up-to-
the-maximum sophisticated as the respective corporate (Western-European) COE’s, but 
can well be applied and are much less costly. The cost for R&D services is calculated 
on man-hour basis. Therefore in the general process of research consolidation a goal of 
becoming wood care Center Of Excellence. As Estonians basically perform the same 
tasks as the COE it can be said that there is a healthy competition in the MNC. Units 
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strive for better results and faster development speed. China, Indonesia and Vietnam 
bring us an even deeper needs to economize costs and thus there, for instance, research 
is also carried out locally.  
Generally speaking, information concerning R&D is fully available within the 
multinational. Thus if one subsidiary finds it to be in the business interests of the MNC 
to come to its market with some product (from any of the MNC’s units), it can also 
manufacture it. Therefore the R&D manager seeks authorization from the business unit 
level functional head, or some higher-level functional head if necessary.  
Thus, hypothetically speaking, if Hungarian manager finds that a paint has can be sold, 
raw materials effectively procured and local costs kept down; he arranges for receipts to 
be transferred to the subsidiary to start production. There will, however, be corporate 
level restrictions on entering other markets that sister subsidiaries already supply. Also 
there are some restrictions to what brand names can be used.   
When we compare possibilities of development of a subsidiary it can be said that R&D 
is more specific and complex. Therefore the actual production operations are more of a 
matter of ‘proper effective-and-consistent execution’. This provides for footloosness of 
production. For this reason one can also see that sub-business units protect their 
production and try not to let is ‘slip away’. Thus here we can see that relationships 
between subsidiaries can be to a degree competitive.  
Estonian R&D department has been a corporate supplier of its know-how to subsidiaries 
in Argentina, Indonesia, Poland, Hungary and Turkey. The complementing strengths of 
Turkish and Polish subsidiaries have enabled ES Sadolin to receive know-how. The 
joint project of developing renovation paint for historical buildings with Italian 
subsidiary is also an example of Estonian subsidiary receiving know-how. If we look at 
the total R&D knowledge flows within the MNC the subsidiary has over its existence 
received much more information than given.  
A final note related to competition between the subsidiaries is from the relocation of 
production from Denmark as ES Sadolin went through a successful internal initiative 
(cd. Birkinshaw [1997]). R&D department of the subsidiary managed to transfer and 
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initialise production of 20 0 receipts during one year by maintaining quality and 
adjusting to specifics of local machinery used.  
The process ended well for the people that were let go from the Danish operations as 
other job opportunities became available during the layoffs. Still, if relationships with 
the Danes had been good, they worsened during the process, as Estonians were basically 
the ones taking away the Danes’ jobs. Although information concerning such issues as 
receipts of products and relationships with cans’ suppliers are basically a property of the 
employer, people were reluctant to transfer to Estonians. Process went most smoothly 
on R&D level as Danish lab was kept operating. More problems occurred on ordinary 
employee level, perhaps also with mid level managers.  
For the Danish subsidiary the uneasiness of the situation is understandable. Denmark is 
the country were Sadolin was created 230 years ago. Just as well the wood care product 
Pinotex originates from there. The multinational has a trademark there that in its 
strength is among top five throughout the country – in any industry. And in such 
background a ‘younger sibling’ managed to overtake operations.  
As we have seen there have been both competitive and co-operational aspects in ES 
Sadolin’s development. The company is quite free in its decisions, operating in, as Akzo 
Nobel terms it, the decentralized network of the multinational. Over the years ES 
Sadolin has, through its financial results, shown excellence in the context of the MNC. 
This can be considered as means for ‘buying’ operational freedom within the 
multinational. As far as the numbers are good all one has to do is to follow corporate 
level policy. We can consider ES Sadolin to be an autonomous subsidiary in our 
research as it has gained a reputable position within the MNC over the last six years.  
In the automotive glazing world market main competitors are Saint-Gobain Sekurit, 
Pilkington, Asahi from Japan and PPG from USA. When new car models are introduced 
there is a competitive bidding for supplying rights.   
As at first the demand for new products is growing, bigger factories of Saint-Gobain 
Sekurit perform the production. The volumes produced reach millions of sets. When 
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product reaches saturation phase the production of glazing is phased out to smaller 
factories, so that bigger factories can retain large volumes.  
In glazing, products supplied go to Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM), that is 
straight to car factories; to official replacement market, that is to spare parts market 
through official dealership of the car plants; or to aftermarket under glazing company’s 
trademark. It is possible, that quality standards for producing to different markets vary. 
(Areas, where micro stain is allowed, standards on allowing dust between layers of glass 
are examples of such differentiation.) The fact that a product is being phased out 
eventually leads to the car being no longer produced, meaning that the OEM market no 
longer exists.  
Estonian factory is a niche factory in the corporate context. One reason for not 
supplying production lines directly is in the fact that subsidiary operates far from car 
factories. As these companies maintain absolute minimum stocks they need new 
deliveries on hourly basis, which is hard to achieve from Estonia. Especially given the 
additional need to cross EU border in Poland. Still distance is not the only reason for the 
coporate level decision, as SGSEST used to supply car factories in Poland and Russia in 
earlier phases of its development.  
There is also a small-scale production going directly to assembly lines, such as in case 
of Volvo. In Swedish factory a decision to cease production for road construction 
vehicles was also made in order to maintain big volume production. SGSEST yearly 
produces only around 11 000 items for Volvo. But as, for instance, producing for one 
type of Mercedes, output is directed to official aftermarket.  
As can be seen from Saint-Gobain’s organizational chart depicted in Appendix 3, there 
are a number of factories operating under Transportation Division. The sales of spare 
parts market are handled by another unit of Saint-Gobain named Autover. Autover has 
warehouses in different countries. In earlier phases of development the goal of SGSEST 
was to penetrate new markets and obtain a market share there. Right now these 
operations are parts of Autover, thus we can say that SGSEST mainly has one client that 
operates in intra-corporate market.  
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Autover’s multiple warehouses have direct contacts with Sekurit’s different factories. 
SGSEST sends its products to Belgium, Sweden, Poland and Austria, for example. In 
ES Sadolin’s example we saw that internal markets of the multinational were potentially 
opened. In SGSEST’s case we can also bring examples of openness from cases when 
different subsidiaries have not matched expected price levels. Autover has then made 
purchases from independent producers. 
To evaluate performance of Sekurit’s different factories the MNC, just as Akzo Nobel, 
uses comparative benchmarking. Next to (monetary) controlling performed in 
subsidiaries all non-financial characteristics are gathered in a system named TABIA. 
TABIA shows indicators concerning quality, stock, warehouse, production outturn, raw 
material yield; and man-hour-, direct-, indirect-, general- and machine specific 
productivity. Thus everything that can be measured in square meters, items, percentages 
and ratios is a part of TABIA. The system provides a comparison of operations located 
in different countries.  
TABIA brings us to a measure of control within the multinational. When compared with 
Skandinavian MNCs (as Akzo Nobel also has Scandinavian roots), which tend to be 
decentralized, French MNCs usually exercise a more tight central control. Such is also 
the case of Saint-Gobain. Thus, for instance, financial management of the subsidiary 
takes place not through biannual but monthly reporting. Also on monthly basis TABIA 
files are sent to Paris, which consolidates reports of around 40 plants. Upcoming 
investments are decided way ahead, as they are at first introduced into five-year 
business plans and go subsequently through all shorter term plans.  
Although SGSEST’s reporting structure is tighter than was the case for ES Sadolin, 
there are no major implications for the autonomy of the subsidiary. This subsidiary is 
also autonomous, although ES Sadolin was especially so – operating its own 
geographical sub-business unit. When comparing the orientation of initiatives that 
subsidiaries take we will subsequently see, that if ES Sadolin was oriented more 
towards external markets (external initiatives), SGSEST is right now internally oriented 
(taking internal initiatives within the MNC, although orientation towards new markets 
has also been a characteristic of subsidiary in its earlier development phases, as 
discussed earlier).  
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After the beginning of production in 1991 main steps of development of the company 
have been starting the production of side windows and the expansion of windscreens 
production. Still the growth of the company has been continuous. It has also taken place 
by increasing the number of shifts at work, and subsidiary also varies the number of 
days worked by a single shift. Subsidiary’s and its general manager’s initiative in 
achieving the growth of company have been of decisive importance. For example as the 
production of side windows started, SGSEST won the investment while competing with 
the subsidiaries from Poland and Portugal. When the production of windscreens was 
expanded some operations formerly taking place in Sweden were divided between 
Poland and Estonia. Good financial results have provided the possibility for these 
decisions that are made on the level of Saint-Gobain Sekurit’s management with also 
Estonian general manager participating.  
Estonian subsidiary has following departments: procurement, production, sales, quality 
and environment; and finance. The subsidiary performs only production and thus 
development, but no research takes place. As the production at first takes place in 
central factories, R&D laboratories are in contact with those while introducing 
production. Estonian subsidiary has contacts with central factories, not laboratories 
while the products are being phased over. 
When a product is being introduced in SGSEST, employees of plants make mutual, 
couple of days long visits. There is both hardware and software transferred. Depending 
on which things are possible to take over transfers are made. For example, bending 
frames and technical data of products may become of use. Software wise the job of 
SGSEST’s production department is to redo the manufacturing of the glass. The 
parameters of a glass being its measures, convexity, angles, optics, and internal 
tensions. 
The MNC has contributed during the development of the subsidiary. As production was 
expanded there was an engineer from MNC’s headquarters assisting the technical side 
of the project. There are numerous training programs taking place, for instance in one 
central institution in France. Topics covered include management, financial 
management, costing, internal audit, work safety, marketing, personnel management, 
logistics, bending glass etc.  
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There are workshops, where participants are asked to present ‘best practice’ cases from 
personal experience, and in this process we can already speak of different subsidiaries 
exchanging know-how cooperatively. Also temporary working groups are formed – for 
instance in order to introduce financial software in the multinational, such as was the 
case with Enterprise Resource Planning.  
Cooperation also takes place in technology related programs, the main topics discussed 
concern glass and folio bending. Such work takes place on sites. When, for example, a 
new furnace was installed, its operators spent weeks abroad. There have been 
employees of other plants visiting Estonia, such as for instance a three-day visit paid by 
Czech employees as a new folio bending device had become operational in Estonia. 
Also an employee from Indian factory came to receive know-how.  
In case of employees of Thailand’s subsidiary visiting, SGSEST was the receiver of 
knowledge about bending folio. In a recent visit to Germany, SGSEST’s employees 
received know-how about bending glass. The technology of making extruded glass was 
learned from the Czechs.  
Due to SGSEST’s small volumes, its production know-how is of a somewhat specific 
nature and there is a shortage of application examples. Thus it might be so that some 
workshops, where employees of Mexican, Brazilian or German subsidiaries set the tone, 
are just interesting as examples of how huge factories are operated, but not applicable at 
home.  
Although SGSEST is not able to produce rear windows, it doesn’t complicate matters 
much, as its target is the aftermarket. For car companies it would be much more 
important to purchase all components from one location. Furthermore, it should be 
noted, that there is by nature a smaller demand for rear windows producers, as the main 
sources of damage – small randomly flying stones, damages by break-ins, and car 
accidents – affect rear windows the least. 
Within Saint-Gobain Sekurit also different factories produce for the aftermarket. There 
are different characteristics determining the success. Besides these mentioned in the 
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discussion of benchmarking, importance lies in quickness and ability to meet deadlines, 
quality, flexibility, and price.  
There are some general rules that warehouses have to follow, which are set through the 
mandatory lists. Mandatory lists set ranges of products that have to be bought from 
specific factories. Thus, for instance, the Polish subsidiary is in the mandatory list for 
Volkswagen cars, DaimlerChrysler’s Mercedes cars get their glazing from the German 
subsidiary and Volkswagen’s Škoda cars are supplied by the Czech subsidiary. 
Exceptions of a few thousand items may be created, but bigger violations are not 
prohibited.  
It is noteworthy that despite being situated in the outskirts of its region SGSEST still 
has competitive edge. This although its production inputs are transported from Germany 
and France; and its finished products move back to earlier mentioned warehouses in 
Europe. Low labor and energy costs as well as taxes also contribute for the efficiency of 
the subsidiary. 
When comparing the amount of subsidiary’s orders received with other corporate 
producers, we see it succeeding. Sekurit’s subsidiaries located in Finland and Italy also 
produce for the aftermarket. Also besides producing for Škoda, the Czech subsidiary is 
active in production for this niche. There is also an overlap with the Polish production 
operations as well. Additionally a factory producing windscreens and side windows, just 
as SGSEST does, is located in India. It produces for the local market, but would also be 
interested in expanding its operations by targeting other – for instance European – 
markets. 
As a consequence of having overlapping operations and same buying partners, there is 
also competition between subsidiaries. When we considered cooperation that takes 
place between subsidiaries, many instances occur with subsidiaries that are not niche 
producers. Such is the case in contacts with German, French and Swedish subsidiary. 
Still as already described there is also good cooperation with, for instance, Czech 
subsidiary.  
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The nature of relationships also depends on the state of the industry, as in buyers market 
like the one existing right now, it is harder to obtain orders. Thus for every factory, and 
different types of operation taking place within factories the amount of orders received 
directly translates into number of shifts at work and days worked in a shift. Which 
means that these are the jobs of employees of any subsidiary depending on the ability to 
perform well within the MNC. When a subsidiary introduces a new product, there is a 
possibility that in small number of cases cost price levels attained are not sufficient for 
Autover and the product will not be purchased. Such introductions will on the one hand 
still mean that subsidiary has a wider range of products to offer for its clients, but on the 
other hand, if the products will practically not be used (which seldom also happens), the 
cost of development might be considered as ‘garbage’ cost.  
Concerning relationships, there are instances within the MNC where openness (and free 
movement of information) with other subsidiaries ought to be bigger. People working in 
the subsidiary feel there to be a competition between sister units, but this of course is 
already established in the general framework of the MNC. 
In conclusion we again see a situation, where the subsidiary has to find a balance 
between internal competition and knowledge sharing. In the global car industry this goal 
is harder achieve than it was in coatings business.  
We are next going to take the subsidiary general managers’ viewpoint concerning our 
research problem. In ES Sadolin’s case the more competitive situations in subsidiary’s 
history have had their roots mainly in ‘objective’ rather than ‘subjective’ reasons. 
Meaning that for instance the production in the center of Copenhagen simply became 
very expensive due to various additional expenditures rather than decreasing 
effectiveness of production. Therefore there is less complexity in finding a balance 
between being competitive and sharing freely. Also the system of benchmarking the 
subsidiaries’ operations and thereafter dispersing the best practice examples helps to 
maintain the balance, as well as the fact that markets are assigned geographically to sub-
business units. Thus Estonians have, for instance, been free to make visits to 
Scandinavian plants. In case of R&D, though, the historical COE in wood care is to a 
degree protective, when higher (managerial) level contacts are considered. 
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In case a need to balance the subsidiary better would arise there are several lateral 
connections that SGM has. He takes part in a body governing the business unit. Also 
there are meetings taking place on the level of the whole corporation, including the 
meeting of country coordinators where one representative from each country attends. 
Between these two levels also Coatings Group meetings take place. SGM can 
additionally become a member of different bodies if he wishes.  
In ES Sadolin’s case the importance of subsidiary general manager’s role lies in 
balancing the sub-business unit instead. For an employee the contradiction can be said 
to lie in directing ones efforts towards the success of the legal entity as opposed to 
operational entity. 
An example can be brought from a creation of a new company in one of SBUs 
countries. As a company would start its operations small there would only be around ten 
employees. The expectations of ES Sadolin’s SGM (who is the head of SBU, acting in 
its interests) would be for the manager of the new company to devote 70% of his energy 
into representing all different parts of the SBU and 30% into developing the local 
subsidiary. The manager in question on the other hand might want develop the local 
company more. 
There are cases, when Akzo Nobel’s expansion has created a competitive environment 
within the corporation. In many countries the multinational has developed by mergers 
and acquisitions. Thus, after the merger of Akzo and Nobel itself two fierce competitors 
on United Kingdom market found themselves to be within one company. 
There are no such cases in Baltics, Russia & Ukraine sub-business unit. But, for 
instance, after Estonians started operating the Moscow factory, there were next to 
already existing complementary brands also those founded on same base receipts. 
Consolidating by stopping production of those meant losing their creations to 
developers. As there were already established own products and working client 
relationships sometimes the tendency was to concentrate on those. Also it was seen, that 
if a product goes out of Russian warehouse, it is its own and helps the factory start 
turning profit.  
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For the SGM the goal is to work through these contrarieties. As the issues are discussed, 
for example it is made clear, that the assessment of Russian subsidiary’s results is based 
on success of the MNC as a whole and sales of all products are rewarded. The fact that 
an Estonian heads the Moscow factory helps to achieve the balance. Thus for the SGM 
there can be no competition between the Moscow and Rapla factory as it is the SBU 
level that matters. It doesn’t rule out the possibility that people in the lower positions in 
Estonian factory are patriots of specifically their operation. 
SGM additionally handles relationships with SBUs from other markets. Thus, for 
instance, the SBU of Turkey has its salespeople in Russia selling complementary 
products. There was also similar effort in Lithuania by Poles, but SGM decided that as 
BU&R is the sub-business unit’s marketing area, Estonian marketing started selling the 
products itself. In case SGMs take such decisions, they rearrange the way profit is 
divided between BUs. In the latter case as Poles had been receiving full profit at market 
prices, their situation weakened as BU&R SBU started buying products from them at 
intra corporate prices. Likewise BU&R transfers its profits to Scandinavia while 
producing for that market. 
Moving on to the case of Saint-Gobain Sekurit Eesti’s subsidiary general manager, we 
see that in his subsidiary the competitive issues arising relate more to the day-to-day 
effectiveness of the operations. There is a price-based competition for supplying the 
corporate clients.  
An important point to make is that the subsidiary general manager’s goal can be 
formulated as a need to unite the level of organization as a whole – where the MNCs 
always have to declare unity – and the ‘human’ level, on which employees have to act 
in the interest of the job opportunity, their career etc. By successfully dealing with these 
two levels that exist in an organization, the SGM balances internal competition with 
knowledge sharing. 
In SGSEST subsidiary general manager also has lateral connections, besides the line of 
command he is a part of. He participates in managerial bodies – on the level of Saint-
Gobain Sekurit International, as well as Saint-Gobain Sekurit International’s 
Transportation Division. There are also bodies that are formed between Transportation 
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Division from the one side and Saint-Gobain Sekurit or Autover from the other (see the 
relationship on organizational chart in Appendix 3). One example of lateral connections 
that he has is through Transportation Division’s committee. 
The organizational culture of Saint-Gobain, influenced by the French origins, is soft and 
encourages discussion. In case inter-subsidiary problems, that SGM has to address, arise 
he also uses his information and action position working through persuasion and 
convincing, not authority. 
As was also evident in ES Sadolin’s case, the success of (lower level) horizontal 
connections between subsidiaries is formed on case-by-case basis and depends on 
personal relationships as well as intercultural communication. The mission of SGM as 
the most international employee of SGSEST is to revive such relationships in case any 
problems have arisen. He has to gain accessibility to the information needed as well as 
address concerns of Estonian employees.  
In conclusion we may say that as in ES Sadolin’s case the SGM was overseeing a 
regional headquarters he relied more on his authority position (by making changes in 
the way SBU was managed); in case of SGSEST SGM relied on his information and 
action position in order to resolve conflict situations – both working to keep a balance 
between internal competition and knowledge sharing.  
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CONCLUSION 
In our work we saw that during the last decades the environment that the MNCs operate 
in has changed – becoming more volatile and less pacedly growing. In this environment 
the MNCs themselves have become more complex and also flexible. We found that 
MNCs are essentially three-dimensional, that is, they organize around product, 
functional and geographical dimensions and exhibit characteristics that having a 
common origin can be applied along any one dimension.  
Therefore we depicted MNCs as having a divergent, partially overlapping structural 
map. On that map there can, for instance, be functionally oriented Centers-Of-
Excellence; product dimension World Product Mandates; and for capturing synergy of a 
big set of operations country dimension based arrangements.  
Analyzing the development of organizational aspects of MNC theories we saw different 
bodies of work pointing to a similar direction. We followed developments of concepts 
Heterarchy, Transnational (and the related Individualized Corporation), works of 
interorganizational theories school (the multicentered MNC), works considering 
autonomous strategic decisions, and works originating from subsidiary (host) country 
research. In addition to the structural developments mentioned earlier these works also 
point to a need to empower the frontline units.  
Outlining our research problem the conceptualization of MNCs as operating 
(competitive) internal markets was shown to rely on entrepreneurial, initiative taking 
behavior and result in the development of the subsidiary. We classified the subsidiaries 
– first selecting operations substantial enough and then differentiating them based on 
the autonomy level, as it has implications for the types of initiatives taken. 
While internal markets concept can be said to put more emphasis on competitive 
behavior in MNCs, conceptualizations such as MNCs as coevolving systems 
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concentrate more on cooperative sharing that has to take place. Symbolically referring 
we considered COE to represent sharing that takes place, while WPM was an 
embodiment of competition, and subsidiary general manager, being on the third – 
country – dimension, balances the two. SGM has an important part in both processes – 
as he is an important ‘cross-pollinator’ of ideas as well as initiative process champion. 
Next, the most contributive involvement that the SGM has was researched. A case study 
was conducted, where SGMs role in balancing the subsidiary between internal 
competition and knowledge sharing was investigated. Nine interviews were made with 
managers of subsidiaries ES Sadolin (Akzo Nobel) and Saint-Gobain Sekurit Eesti 
(Saint-Gobain). 
The structure of the MNCs studied had indeed complex embodiments. Thus, for 
instance, there were Centers-Of-Excellence – as a part of Akzo Nobel’s R&D structure, 
and also the goal of ES Sadolin’s laboratory was to become one. There were also 
temporary COE like formations, with a goal to disperse best practice information. Also 
different forms of mandating were present: subsidiary producing for markets besides its 
usual ones (AN), a subsidiary winning a competitive bidding for a new production 
mandate (SG). There were also numerous instances of cooperative bodies formed with 
employees of different subsidiaries participating.  
The structure of the subsidiary was much more complex in AN’s case, as the subsidiary 
was a regional headquarters. AN’s subsidiary represented the full value added scope of 
operations as SG’s concentrated on production mainly.  
In both cases the internal markets within the multinational were operational and also 
open. In case of AN R&D services as well as end- and intermediate products could be 
purchased from other subsidiaries, as the regional headquarters had gained rights to 
operate its markets. In SG there were cases of purchases from external market instead of 
corporate suppliers. 
Both subsidiaries can be considered autonomous, still AN’s was especially so. It had 
implications as suggested in theory – AN’s subsidiary was oriented more towards the 
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external market opportunities than SG’s subsidiary. The level of autonomy suggested 
that local subsidiaries had indeed been empowered. 
As subsidiary is not as internally oriented, and also as the factors behind transfer of 
operations have been of more ‘objective’ nature the subsidiary general manager has to 
do less balancing in AK’s case. There was also a system of combining competitive 
benchmarking with best practice transferals in place. Instead, his efforts are directed 
towards keeping part of the sub-business unit (region) from taking parochial, non-
cooperative point of view. 
SG’s subsidiary general manager has to make a bigger effort in balancing the 
subsidiary. In price based competition with sister subsidiaries that produce for the same 
niche, there are situations where cooperation ought to be bigger. As in his counterpart’s 
case, there are lateral connections that can be utilized in order to achieve the better 
functioning of the MNC as a whole.  
In order to balance the subsidiary a goal that subsidiary general manager has to achieve 
can be formulated as a need to unite the level of organization as a whole – where the 
MNCs always have to declare unity – and the ‘human’ level on which employees have 
to act in the interest of the job opportunity, their career etc.  
There is a difference in means that the subsidiary general managers can use. As a 
regional head, AN’s SGM takes the authority position to better maintain balance 
between sharing and competing. SG’s SGM uses persuasion and convincing – works 
through his action and information position – for reaching the same goal.  
This does to a degree rebut the research hypothesis that was put forth before the 
empirical investigation. Hypothesis proposed, that authority position would be of use 
while balancing the subsidiary between countering demands of internal competition and 
knowledge sharing. In our case the authority position has helped AN’s subsidiary head 
– but to maintain the balance in his region, in operations directly responsible to him 
only. In the case of needing to balance the operations below a SGM with operations in 
another sub unit – as was the case in SG, the subsidiary general manager used his 
information and action dimension positions instead. 
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APPENDIXES 1-3 
Appendix 1. Questionnaire sent beforehand. 
 
Millised on olnud erinevad allüksuse arenguetapid? 
 
Kas läbi erinevate etappide on initsiatiiv laienemiseks tulnud allüksusest või on 
määravaks saanud emafirma keskne juhtimine? Kust on tulnud investeeringud? 
Milline on olnud laienemise läbiviimise protsess, kes on olnud tegevad? 
Kas on olnud luhtunud tegutsemise laiendamise plaane? 
Kas läbi tegutsemise on olnud konkurentsi teistelt allüksustelt? 
 
 
Millised on olnud koostööd nõudvad olukorrad läbi organisatsiooni toimimise? 
 
Millist koolitust on ettevõte läbi toimimise emafirmalt saanud, milline teadmiste 
ülekanne on toimunud? 
Millistes multinatsionaali läbivates harvemini või tihedamalt toimivates tööorganistes 
(kirjanduses: task force, commitee) osalevad allüksuse töötajad koostöös inimestega 
teistest allüksustest? 
Milline on välislähetusse saatmise poliitika multinatsionaalis, kuidas liigub tööjõud? 
Kas on olnud koostööd arendustegevuse vallas? 
 
 
Millisel kohal multinatsionaali hierarhias asub allüksus ja kui iseotsustav on Eesti 
allüksus? 
Millised on multinatsionaali meetodid allüksuse edukuse (hind, kvaliteet) määramisel?  
Kas allüksuse võimaluse tellimusi saada määrab nö. multinatsionaali sisemisel turul 
edukas olemine? 
Kas multinatsionaali sees on ka üksusi, kellele on määratud roll teistele oma teadmisi 
edasi anda? 
 
 
Kas konkurents teiste allüksustega on vajalik? Kas koostöö tegemine on vajalik, kas 
seda tehakse piisavalt? Kuidas leitakse tasakaal koos töötamise ja konkureerimise 
vahel? 
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Appendix 2. Organizational chart of Akzo Nobel’s Decorative Coatings International business unit. 
Source: Akzo Nobel’s intranet  
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Appendix 3. Organizational chart of Saint-Gobain Sekurit’s Flat glass Division. 
Source: www.sain-gobain-sekurit-transport.com/instit/orga/index.htm 
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SISUKOKKUVÕTE 
Multinatsionaalsete ettevõtetes toimunud organisatsiooniliste muutuste käigus on 
viimasel ajal esile kerkinud uurimissuund, mille fookuseks on allüksuste juhtimise 
probleemid. Sellist vaatenurka põhjendab fakt, et allüksuste potentsiaali rakendamisel 
on võitjaks ettevõte tervikuna.  
Selle üle kui suur peaks olema tippjuhi (SGM) otsustusvõim lähevad arvamused lahku. 
Antud uurimuse eesmärgiks on vaadelda allüksuse tippjuhi rolli, millega ta ettevõttele 
kõige rohkem kasulik saab olla. Kasulikkust uuritakse kontekstis, kus tippjuht peab 
allüksuses saavutama tasakaalu teiste allüksustega konkureerimise ja teadmiste vaba 
jagamise vahel.  
Töös leitakse, et MNCs on oma olemuselt kolmedimensionaalsed, nii et erinevad 
omadused võivad olla käsitletud ja rakendatud kas toote, funktsionaalse või 
geograafilise aspekti vaatenurgast. Graafiliselt kujutame MNCd kui divergentse, 
osaliselt kattuva struktuurikaardiga organisatsiooni. Teadmiste tippkeskus (COE) on 
näide funktsioonimõõtme prevaleerimisest, samas kui tootmismandaat tootedimensiooni 
rõhutab; ning juhtumiks kus geograafiline mõõde prevaleerib on suure arvu ühes riigis 
asuvate operatsioonide sünergia eesmärgil koordineerimine. 
Töös vaadeldakse multinatsionaalide teooria arengut, seda kuidas tekkisid praegused 
struktuurilahendused ning kuidas allüksustele rohkem otsustusõigust antakse. 
Käsitletakse heterarhiat, transnatsionaali, interorganisatsiooni koolkonda, autonoomseid 
strateegilisi otsuseid ja asukohariigi poolt algatatud uuringuid.  
Uurimisprobleemi raames tuuakse välja nii kirjeldused, mis rõhutavad konkurentsi 
MNC sees – sisemiste turgude käsitlus – kui ka koostööd ja vaba jagamist – koos 
arenevate süsteemide käsitlus. Nii konkureerivate initsiatiivide kui teadmiste jagamisel 
toimuva kontaktide loomise juures on tippjuhil suur roll. Allüksustest valitakse välja 
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suuremad, ning nende vahel tehakse vahet autonoomia järgi, kuna see omab tähtsust 
MNC sees konkureerimisel.  
Kaasusuuringuga tegeldakse kahe allüksusega – ES Sadolin (Akzo Nobel) ja Saint-
Gobain Sekurit Eesti (Saint-Gobain) – ja viiakse läbi üheksa intervjuud.  
Multinatsionaalide struktuur on kompleksne, esinevad nii COEd kui mandaadid. 
Töötavad allüksustevahelised koostööorganid. AN puhul on allüksuse struktuur 
keerulisem, kuna tegu on regionaalse peakorteriga, SG allüksus tegeleb tootmisega.  
Mõlemal MNCl töötavad ja on avatud sisemised turud – AN puhul näiteks nii vahe- ja 
lõpptoodangu ning R&D puhul. Mõlemad allüksused on autonoomsed, eriti AN. 
Vastavalt sellele on AN ka rohkem valise turu initsiatiividelel suunatud, kui SG kasutab 
sisemist initsiatiivi. 
Regioonile orienteeritud AK allüksuse puhul ei ole esinenud väga suurt sisemist 
konkurentsi – ja seega peab SGM vähem tasakaalu leidmisega tegelema. Operatsioonid, 
mida on üle viidud, on pigem liikunud väga selgelt jälgitavatel objektiivsetel põhjustel. 
Samas on AK allüksuse SGM tegev konkurentsi ja vaba jagamise vahelise tasakaalu 
leidmisega regiooni sees.  
SG allüksuse SGM peab tasakaalu leidmiseks tegema suuremaid pingutusi. Olles 
sõsarfirmadega hinnakonkurentsis esineb olukordi kus koostööd võiks olla rohkem. 
SGMil on võimalik kasutada oma sidemeid MNC sees. SGM peab leidma ühendama 
organisatsiooni kui terviku (deklareeritav ühtsus) ja ‘inimeste’ tasandid (enda huvides 
tegutsemine, karjäär, töökoht). 
Kui AN juht kasutab regiooni sees tasakaalu loomisel oma võimupositsiooni, siis SG 
puhul on tegu pigem veenmisega ja mõjutamisega (informatsiooni ja tegeliku 
tegutsemisvõimaluse positsioonilt). Selline tulemus ei ühti tõstatatud 
uurimushüpoteesiga, mis eeldas, et võimupositsiooni saab kasutada ka 
(all)üskustevahelise, mitte ainult üksuse (regiooni) sisese tasakaalu leidmise vahendina.  
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i
 this part should be updated with real situation 
ii
 what about strategic business units? 
iii
 Rat process link 
iv
 coe link 
vi
 should the last part of this sentence not have more ground to stand on? 
vii
 Link this to internal competition – you get conflicting map directly linked in too 
viii
 Last sentence should rather be replaced with a more complete review of the anatomy, physiology and 
psychology. 
ix
 What was the exact distinction between functional dimension and the staff? 
x
 Roolaht – this is not MNC exclusive  
xi
 Am I sure there is no contradiction? 
xii
 Link to org_culture if possible, and change back the sentence. 
xiii
 link to initiatives at first place; also there seems to be a little contradiction – if early slack work wrote 
of the need for slack and GB lately wrote that the slack has been granted, then why is there still a need to 
dig on B statement about the need for stockiness. If ample space has been granted. 
xiv
 It is actually added that practice market is facilitated by strong corporate culture and incentive systems 
that reward propensity to cooperate. 
